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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between permanent income and homicides, estimating an 
income-crime elasticity. We assume that this elasticity varies across geographical areas. We 
estimate different specifications of Spatial Panel Models using information of urban areas in 
Medellin (Colombia), areas known as communes. Spatial Models consider the importance of 
location and the type of neighbors of each commune. We simulate an intervention over 
permanent income in order to estimate the income elasticity for each commune and the 
average elasticity of income-crime on the city. We provide evidence about spatial dependence 
between the homicides per commune and their neighbors, and about a relationship between 
homicides and neighbor’s income. In our case of study, the average estimated impact of 1% 
increase in permanent income in a specific commune produces a decrease in the homicide rate 
on average in 0.39%. Finally, permanent income plays a crime deterrent role, but also this 
effect of income on crime varies across the city, showing that some areas are strategically 
located to this kind of intervention. 
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1. Introduction 
From the classical perspective of the Economic Theory of Crime, the criminal act obeys to a 
rational decision by the individual which is the result of a comparison between the expected 
utility of the crime and its cost (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973; Lochner, 1999). Also, the 
criminal acts constitute one of cities’ major problems. This kind of problem is usually faced 
by regional level governments (Brooks, 2008). 
Studies about crime reduction have focused on the analysis of the discouragement of the 
availability of the police force and, on the efficiency of the judicial system. Nonetheless few 
works have studied the dissuasive effect that income may have on crime on a spatial unit. 
This article aims to evaluate the effect of average work income in the homicides level, given 
that the communes are not isolated territorial units and, that it brings the relevance to consider 
spatial relations. For this purpose, we estimate different spatial panel data models, which use 
as independent variable the total number of homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Also, we use 
the permanent income as our main explanatory variable, joint with variables that represent the 
spatial relationships across communes. 
There is a part of each criminal act that occurs within a territorial unit that should be explained 
by the characteristics of that same unit. However, the characteristics of those neighbors of the 
unit can also influence the level of crime. The criminal activity in a particular commune can 
be a source of externality to nearby communes (such externality can be either positive or 
negative). This means that being close to a commune with high levels of criminal activity may 
have an effect on the own crime, disregarding the initial economic conditions. This important 
relationship between neighbors and their characteristics is what is commonly called as spatial 
analysis. 
In the last four decades Medellin has been one of the Latin American cities with the highest 
crime levels, mainly caused by drug dealing structures and organized crime (Gaviria & Pagés, 
2002).  
This city reached the highest homicide level in 1991 with 381 deaths per 100 thousand 
inhabitants, being cataloged as the most violent city in the world that year. Nevertheless, this 
situation changed progressively. For example, the homicide rate in 2014 was 26.95 homicides 
per 100,000 inhabitants. 
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Our results show that permanent income has a statistically significant effect as a deterrent 
mechanism to reduce crime in Medellin’s communes. Moreover, we find that spatial panel 
specifications capture a lower marginal effect of an intervention on permanent income in 
comparison with traditional panels. 
This paper contributes to the relationship between homicides and quality of life. Also, it 
formalizes the impact of the ceasefire agreed between illegal groups and Medellin’s local 
government during years 2005-2008 on the city’s homicide level. 
The article is divided into six sections including this introduction. On the second section we 
present the theoretical framework. Then, in the third section we explain our empirical 
approach. To continue, on the fourth section we describe the data used and contextualize our 
case study for Medellin (Colombia). In the fifth section, we present the main stylized facts, 
the results of econometric models, and some robustness tests. Finally, in the last section we 
conclude our paper by summarizing the main results and giving some advice for public policy. 
 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
Various academic studies have been concerned about understanding and finding ways to 
reduce and prevent violence levels, in order to assist states to ensure the welfare conditions 
under which the inhabitants of a country or city live. The economic analysis of crime begins 
its formalization with Becker (1968), who argues that state investment in police force directly 
influences the decrease in crime. Becker (1968) exposed that the probability of apprehension 
and severity in penalties make the individual doubt at the moment of committing a crime. 
For his part, Ehrlich (1973) states that the individual has the opportunity to participate in two 
market activities: one legal and another illegal. This is focused on the efforts and time that 
somebody has to spend to generate some income. In that sense, it compares the time and 
resources that the individual invests in legal and illegal activities, showing a clear 
disadvantage for the latter, given the likelihood of being arrested. For a person to act illegally, 
it will be sufficient that the expected marginal benefit of the crime exceeds the expected 
marginal value of punishment. 
Studies about the causes of criminal activity, like Levitt (2001) & Spelman (2005), have 
related homicides with arrests, convictions, prisons and fundamental socio-economic 
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conditions to explain some determinants of violence. For Bayley (1994), the population’s 
safety does not depend mainly on the police, moreover, many others factors of each area 
(poverty, inequality, urban habitat, migration, etc.) affect further crime levels. 
Related to socio-economic conditions, Hipp (2007, 2011) considered an economic segregation 
variable in the presence of ethnic segregation. He concluded that economic segregation and 
inequalities in income raise the crime rates in cities with ethnic heterogeneity. Additionally, 
poverty lost significance when in the specification is included the income to explain the 
variations in robberies and homicides.  This happens because income can be considered the 
main factor of deterrence in the criminal reasoning. 
South (2005) and Choe (2008) established the income inequalities as a starting point to explain 
the criminal differences in the units of analysis and found differences between the effects of 
short and long terms. Dahlberg & Gustavsson (2008) suggested that the research using the 
total income as an explanatory variable skew the results of the relationship between income 
and crime. The criminal individuals respond to incentives where one of them is the income in 
a legal activity, i.e. work. Then, it is the permanent income and not the transitory one which 
should be considered as a determinant factor for crime. 
Dahlberg & Gustavsson (2008) separated the permanent from the transitory income, and they 
found that increases in the inequality due to differences in permanent income have a positive 
and significant effect on the total number of crimes (both violent and property) while an 
increase in the inequality due to difference in transitory income has no significant variation in 
any type of crime. 
In most of the studies previously analyzed, we exposed the importance of the differences in 
income of the units of analysis, the main effect of economic inequality was positive against 
crime levels. Chintrakarn & Herzer (2012) found evidence of opposite effects between 
inequality and crime, which justify the fact that the greater the equality, the more increases 
the demand for protection of crime, leading to reductions in crime levels. 
Menezes et al. (2013), in a study of the Brazilian city Recife, using spatial econometrics, found 
evidence of spatial dependence and the existence of direct and indirect effects. The 
investigation concluded that inequality indeed increased the homicide levels by a direct effect, 
but due to the spatial relationship between neighborhoods, this effect is mitigated by the 
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indirect one. In addition, the average income has a negative and significant relationship with 
the homicides, but a not significant positive indirect effect. 
This relations show that the economic structure of a country is an important factor in the 
dynamics of crime, just as variables such as the education levels, migration, urbanization, 
income and expenditure distribution, poverty and wage levels; all factors in which the 
education has a particularly significant impact (Tekely & Günsoy, 2013). 
Fleisher (1966) related the variables crime, income, and education, and found that low levels 
of income can influence of juvenile delinquency and that in areas of extremely high crime 
levels, an income increase of 1% can cause a decrease of 2.5% in the crime rate. 
Freeman (1996) and Lochner (1999) showed that criminal acts have a direct relationship with 
the phenomena of juvenile delinquency and low educational level. However, the education 
may refer to all levels of it, from preschool to tertiary education. Alcan & Şhahin (2011) 
showed that illiteracy is one of the characteristics explains criminality and that this can be 
improved increasing the minimum education level of the population. 
Sánchez (2003) in a study for the city of Bogotá, states that public policies referred as 
“zanahoria”  (measured by the unemployment rate and public spending on the social sector) 
generate a negative impact on homicides and thefts. 
Medina et al. (2011) identify some general characteristics of violence in the city of Medellín 
and the main costs that this phenomenon represents for public policy. Meanwhile, Martin 
(2012) makes an analysis of the condition of violence, mafia, and crime in the city during 
1975-2012. In this research, a period that can be framed in the years 2005-2008 is referenced, 
in which illegal armed groups under the direction of Diego Fernando Murillo Bejarano, alias 
“Don Berna”, exercised activities that redounded in an improvement in the security, which 
some attribute to a guaranteed governance by that leader (“Donbernabilidad”) .  
These very special conditions of the city during this time arose a secondary hypothesis about 
the negative impact that the so-called “Donbernabilidad” had on crime. This hypothesis will 
be driven in this research, what we want to test specifically is if there is any evidence that 
during the period of 2005-2008 the homicides rate was significantly lower than the trend 
trajectory of the crime variable. It is noteworthy that this period will also include unobservable 
factors such as the social efforts of the municipal government to attend the demobilized during 
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this time. However, we rely on if there is evidence of different trajectory, a considerable part 
of that difference is given by the “donbernabilidad” effect. 
Finally, we identified two articles in which spatial models were implemented to explain the 
relationship between income and crime levels. The first one is from Menezes et al. (2013), 
which has been mentioned above. These authors use regression models with spatial lag in 
violent crime (dependent variable) and in error, using distinctions between direct and indirect 
effects and including the average income of each neighborhood of Recife. The second article 
is from Scorzafave & Soares (2009), in which the calculation of the elasticity of inequality by 
crime is made, mainly of property crime. This study presents, as one of its contributions, the 
estimation of the elasticity income-crime in a spatial regression, arguing that it should be 
negative and inelastic. We expect that improvements in permanent income due to some 
political interventions lead to reductions in crime. However, according to the initial levels of 
crime and economic conditions, the response could be lower than the impulse given, meaning 
that the elasticity should be greater than -1 and lower than zero. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
We rely in the following specification to analyze the determinants of the homicide rate in the 
communes of Medellin during the first decade of this century. 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (1) 
Where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a matrix which contains the predetermined variables (income, male population, 
coverage of social security, Quality of Life Index and education variables), 𝛽𝛽 is the 
coefficient’s matrix and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 represent the error term and is equal to 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. The 
parameter 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 represents the individual heterogeneity across communes. However, the 
objective of this analysis is the approaching of the elasticity between income and homicides. 
We can then transform the Eq. (1) to a log-log definition. Besides, we know that ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) − ln(𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/100,000). That means, if we used the 
natural logarithm of homicide rate as dependent variable, we will force the coefficient of 
population equals to one. Rewriting: ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (2) 
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Now 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 refers to a new specification using the log of average work income, male’s 
population, social security enrollment and population. Although this model can be estimated 
using traditional panel strategies like Pool OLS, Fixed Effects and Random Effects 
Methodology; there is also a relationship that cannot be taken into account using those models. 
That relationship is driven by the location of the geographical units, known as spatial effects. 
There is a strong evidence that crime indicators have a spatial relationship between unit’s 
outcomes. That means that the number of homicides in the commune i are particularly related 
with the homicides in its neighbors. Using the specifications developed by Elhorst (2014) we 
define the following model, which corresponds to Spatial Panel specification: ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3) 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (4) 
This is a broad specification of the Spatial Panel Model. However, a more general one can 
include spatial lags of predetermined variables, as following: ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (5) 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (6) 
These last equations are our object of interest. The parameter 𝜌𝜌 captures the incidence of the 
homicides of i’s neighbors on the homicides in the commune i. This parameter gives us the 
impact of being surrounded by a specific type of communes (high or low crime). Similar to 
this is the coefficient 𝛿𝛿, which represents the spatial relationship between the neighbors 
communes through the predetermined variable of average work income, i.e. the level of 
income in the commune i does not only affect the homicides in the commune i, also it affects 
the number of homicides in the neighbors of i. Finally, the last coefficient is 𝜆𝜆, which can be 
defined as the intensity that an exogenous shock can spread through the geographical units 
neighbors of the first affected commune. In other words and assuming that W is now a 
normalize matrix, a 𝜆𝜆 close to one allows than an external shock in i will affect i’s neighbors 
in a similar proportion than i. In the opposite case, 𝜆𝜆 close to cero means that a particular 
shock in i does not have significant impact on i's neighbors. 
As we have mentioned in the last paragraphs, the Eq. (5) and Eq. (6) are the more general 
specification of a Spatial Panel Model, we therefore move on to some particular specifications 
according with different assumptions. 
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1. Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) 
𝛿𝛿 = 𝜆𝜆 = 0 
Rewriting the Eq. (5) and Eq. (6): ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (7) 
This model assumes that the spatial relationship can be captured only through the 
dependent variable. The geographical relationship between neighbors is driven only 
by their crime levels. 
2. Spatial Error Model (SEM) 
𝜌𝜌 = 𝛿𝛿 = 0 
Rewriting: ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (8) 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (9) 
The spread of external shocks is the explanation of the geographical relationship 
between communes. The similarities in the crime behavior are given by the contagious 
of external shocks more than similar trends in the homicide figures. 
3. Spatial Autoregressive Model with Spatial Autoregressive Disturbance (SARAR) 
𝛿𝛿 = 0 
Rewriting: ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (10) 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜆𝜆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (11) 
This specification combines the main ideas of the SAR and SEM models. The spatial 
relation is driven in a direct way through the patterns in homicides between neighbors 
and on an indirect way through the contagious effect of external shocks. 
4. Durbin Model 
𝜆𝜆 = 0 
Replacing in the Eq. (5) and Eq. (6): ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) +𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (12) 
The Durbin Model combines the methodology of the SAR model with a new idea of 
the contagious process. This specification assumes that the shocks are almost 
endogenous and they spread through the dependent and predetermined variables. In 
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our case the predetermined variable that interacts spatially between neighbors is the 
average work income. We thus assume that an external shock in a commune i spreads 
through the changes in homicides and the changes in average work income. 
Although we estimate each one of these Spatial Panel Data Models, we need to contrast the 
results between them to then focus on one specific estimation. In order to do that we apply 
different statistical tests that compare two set of models and allow us to infer which of them 
better represents the information in our dataset. Two main tests will be done: 
1. Test between SAR and Durbin Model 
H0: 𝛿𝛿 = 0 
H1: 𝛿𝛿 ≠ 0 
Statistic: Wald Lineal Test (F distribution) 
Rejection Region: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼) < 𝛼𝛼 
Conclusion: under no rejection of H0 the model that best fit the data is SAR, and under 
rejection of H0 the alternative hypothesis suggests that the Durbin model is a better 
strategy. 
2. Test between SEM and Durbin Model 
H0: 𝛿𝛿 = −𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽 
H1: 𝛿𝛿 ≠ −𝜌𝜌𝛽𝛽 
Statistic: Wald No Lineal Test (F distribution) 
Rejection Region: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼) < 𝛼𝛼 
Conclusion: under no rejection of H0 the model that best fit the data is the Durbin 
Model, and under rejection of H0 the alternative hypothesis suggests that the SEM 
model should be used (Belotti et al, 2013). 
Finally, those specifications allow us to define a way to simulate the effect of an intervention 
in the average work income or according to the literature, in the permanent income. We want 
to show that the homicides responds negatively to a positive shocks in permanent income, but 
this effect is different across geographical units. To corroborate this, we rely on the 
methodology of Drukker et al. (2013). The authors expose a way to estimate the marginal 
effect of an intervention in a predetermined variable on the outcome, and also they break down 
the total marginal effect in the individual and the spatial effect. 
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 4. Case Study: Medellín 
Medellín (Colombia) is a city that in the late twentieth century was characterized by presenting 
phenomena of violence, which placed it among the cities with the highest crime rates in the 
world. This phenomenon has been generated by the presence of different actors among which 
are: delinquency, organized crime, guerrilla, and paramilitaries, who among their strategies to 
gain power have faced the different statements of the government, either through violence or 
coercion through perquisites. 
The national government, through their representatives in the department and in the city, has 
designed policies aimed to counter the criminal phenomena generated by different actors. In 
this case, local governments have made development plans focused on specific objectives 
critical to the city, which have been an important factor in achieving progress in science and 
technology, education, and entrepreneurship. 
Medellín is divided into 16 communes and 5 townships (Figure 1), where the communes are 
generally associated with the urban zone of the city while the townships are associated with 
the rural zone. However, the political division of the communes leads to particular conditions 
that differ from the city’s generality. Having this in mind, we cannot drive analysis without 
focusing on just a particular conditions. For our research, the criminal dynamic in the urban 
zone is much more relevant given that is there where almost all the casualties tend to happen. 
The 5 geographical units corresponding to the townships have more area than those in the 
urban zone. Also, we can argue that there is a natural barrier that divides the rural and the 
urban zone. The limit between those spatial units is given by a set of mountains that has not 
allowed the tendency of many cities of the world, where the urbanization process leads to a 
proper match between the urban zone and the suburbs and areas in the border of the cities. 
The analysis of crime in Medellín should consider the socioeconomic characteristics of each 
commune, which are fundamental to explain not only the behavior of homicides in the city 
but also the criminal tendencies. These specific characteristics of violence within the city 
make it necessary for the research related to crime, its determinants and the impact that this 
phenomenon has on the political and economic conditions of Medellín, to require a spatial 
analysis. A spatial analysis that collects relevant information about how the socioeconomic 
characteristics are distributed and how the different geographical units are related. 
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Figure 1: Communes (urban) and townships (rural) of Medellin 
 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: the graph on the left shows all the city of Medellin where in the middle are located the 16 urban 
communes; and those particularly big units located in the borders correspond to the 5 rural communes 
or townships. The graph on the right is a zoom of the 16 urban communes. 
 
4.1. Dataset 
The dataset used in this analysis contains information from the following institutions:  
Information System for Security and Coexistence – City of Medellin (SISC, for its acronym 
in Spanish), National Institute of Legal Medicine (INML, for its acronym in Spanish), Judicial 
Research Department (Sijin, for its acronym in Spanish), National Police, Survey of Life’s 
Quality, Medellin’s Development Plan 2012-2015, and the statistics department of the City of 
Medellin. 
The variables targeted to this analysis are the homicides, household income, male population, 
Quality of Life Index, Human Development Index, coverage of education levels, and social 
security enrollment. The units of analysis are the 16 communes of Medellin, during the time 
period 2004-2013. 
 
4.2. Variables ln𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: is the natural logarithm of homicides in the commune i year t. 
10 
 
ln(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): natural logarithm of the average monthly household work income in the 
commune i year t. ln(𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): natural logarithm of the total population of the commune i year t. 
𝐷𝐷𝑢𝑢𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐷𝐷: variable which is equal to one during the time period 2005-2008 and zero otherwise. 
This variable was defined to capture the effect of the period called “donbernabilidad”. ln(𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): natural logarithm of male’s population in the commune i year t. ln (𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): natural logarithm of the total population covered by social security in 
the commune i year t. This variable is used as a proxy of formal employment. 
𝑄𝑄𝑢𝑢𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 𝐻𝐻𝑜𝑜 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: Quality of Life index in the commune i year t. 
𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: percentage of illiterate population in the commune i year t. 
𝑈𝑈𝑛𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑢𝑢𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: percentage of population who are enrolled in an university program 
in the commune i year t. 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: spatial lag of the natural logarithm of homicides, i.e. the natural logarithm of the 
homicides of the i’s neighbors in year t. 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖): natural logarithm of the average monthly household work income in the i’s 
neighbors year t. 
𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: spatial lag of the error term. This variable guaranties the contagion effect of external 
shocks as external shocks and not only as a consequence of changes in the homicide of the 
commune first affected. 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖: error term. 
W: square matrix of order equal to n, where n is the number of communes (16). This matrix 
was defined following the rule of contiguity spatial matrix of the queen’s type. In other words, 
we rely in the definition that one commune is neighbor of other if between both of them there 
is a share limit. This assumption is supported by the idea that the contagious effect between 
two communes depends on the interconnections between both. We assume that these 
interconnections are more significant between units who share limits, even more due that we 
have few geographical units. 
𝑊𝑊 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �1 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅 𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅ℎ 𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑢𝑢𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒 𝑗𝑗,∀ 𝑃𝑃 ≠ 𝑗𝑗0 𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑒𝑒                               (13) 
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5. Results 
 
5.1. Summary Analysis 
Medellin was during the 90’s labeled as one of the most dangerous cities in the world. For the 
year 1991, Medellin reached its maximum historic of 381 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
(Figure 2). This rate means that each 10 hours approximately 7 citizens were the victim of 
homicide. After the death of the infamous drug lord Pablo Escobar, the homicide rate in the 
city started to decrease reaching 159.6 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2000. Although 
this rate was high for any government, there was a clear improvement respect to the Medellin 
in the 90’s.  
Nevertheless, our analysis is focused on variability inside the city. For that, we have 
information during the time period 2003-2013, disaggregated by commune. Figure 2 exposes 
the significant declining in the homicide rate for the last 10 years. In 2003, the homicide rate 
in the city was 98.2 per 100,000 inhabitants; and in 2014, the rate was 26.95 per 100,000 
inhabitants. This reduction of 73% of the homicide rate in 10 years can be categorized in two 
periods: 2003-2008 and 2009-2014. 
The first period of analysis, 2003-2008, is mainly predetermined by an external factor. This 
factor has its own character: Diego Murillo Bejarano known as “Don Berna”. “Don Berna” 
was the successor of the drug market after Pablo Escobar died. “Don Berna” commanded an 
illegal armed group known as United Self-Defense of Colombia (AUC, for its acronym in 
Spanish). In December 2003, the combatants from the group “Cacique Nutibara” belonging 
to the AUC demobilized in Medellin. During the following years, “Don Berna” was in charge 
of keeping the order in the city. Although there is evidence of the effects of national programs 
in demobilization (Pena et al., 2015), the situation in Medellin was more like a peace given 
by the concentration of power in one man. We called this first period as “Donbernabilidad”, 
and we define this term as a period of relative peace given by “Don Berna”. 
The following period corresponds to the years 2009 to 2014. Figure 2 shows that after the 
extradition of “Don Berna” in 2008, the homicides rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009 
reached closely the homicide rate in 2003 (94.38 in 2009 respect to 98.2 in 2003). The 
previous paragraph exposed the particular characteristics of the low homicides rates 
experimented at the beginning of the 2000’s. As we mentioned before the trend of the 
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homicides rate prior 2009 was the result of the interaction between city dynamic levels of 
crime and an exogenous shock called “Donbernabilidad”. However, after 2009, this shock was 
no longer present and we can assume that the homicide rate returned to its city dynamic level 
trajectory. 
 
Figure 2: Homicide Rate in Medellin per 100,000 inhabitants, 1990-2014 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from Municipality Statistics 
Note: the graph on the bottom is a zoom for the years of analysis (2203-2014) of this research of the 
graph on the top. 
 
 
This process gave the city public policy some lessons. Crime issues cannot be managed for 
those who commit crimes, structural changes were needed to change the crime trend of the 
city, and security investments are not enough to improve security. The investment on social 
capital and development are crucial to overpass the high crime history.  
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Figure 3: Homicides Rate per 10,000 inhabitants and Average Household Permanent 
Income by urban communes, average 2004-2013 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from SISC and Survey of Life’s Quality 
Note: Intense blue refers to greater values of the variable, i.e. dark blue corresponds to the highest 
homicide rates for the graph on the left and highest permanent income for the graph on the right. 
 
These lessons seem to be learned by the municipality government. There has been a 
continuously decreasing of the homicide rate since 2009, reaching 26.95 homicides per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2014. Compared to the behavior of the crime in the first period, there 
is a structural difference between both. While during the first period the rate decreased 
dramatically at the first year, the following years it remained at similar rates. Instead, the 
second period is characterized for a slightly decrease year by year during the whole period. 
Figure 3 shows the geographical distribution of the average homicide rates and the permanent 
income, measured as monthly average household work income, for the complete time period 
of analysis 2004-2013. Using those maps we can identify the communes where the homicide 
rates behave relatively more problematic. San Javier, La Candelaria and Aranjuez are the 
communes with the highest average homicides rate during the period 2004-2013. Besides, 
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they are in the second quintile of the income distribution (except La Candelaria who belongs 
to the fourth quintile1), setting a starting point in the link between homicides and income. 
In addition, we have thus identified the communes which have had the fewer homicide rates, 
on average during the period of analysis. Those are El Poblado, La America, Buenos Aires 
and Santa Cruz. The first two communes belong to the highest group of income distribution, 
the third one is located in the third quartile and only the last one belongs to the lowest income 
group. This distribution of the average income during the whole period plus the unchanged 
distribution of these variables through the time (see annex 1) also support the importance of 
analyzing these issues using spatial approaches to characterize the crime patterns in a 
disaggregated level (Choe, 2008; Hipp, 2011). 
Using a naïve approach, we would like to put this difference in income distribution into 
perspective. The average labor income in the commune El Poblado was 6.5 times the average 
income of the commune Popular during 2013 while in 2004 this figure was 5.5. This let us 
expose that the income inequality perceived between communes can be increased during the 
last decade. We refer to this statement as a naïve approach because there is an eventually 
spatial self-distribution of income. People who start to earn more can move to other places. 
This will thus maintain the difference in income, however, it cannot totally explain the gap’s 
increase. 
Indeed, this also explains what we can see in annex 1. Focusing on the distribution of the 
Quality of Life Index and Human Development Index between 2004 and 2013, it seems 
unaltered. The communes in the top quintile are concentrated in the south zone, likely related 
to income concentration. Worries arise about how this immobility in life’s quality distribution 
can explain the spatial concentration of other factors, or in another way, those set of factors 
have been leading this life’s quality immobility. In one way or another, these facts expose the 
spatial correlation in the distribution of some main variables across the city, a correlation that 
can help us to find the best place to allocate some policies to intervene and reduce crime. 
Another factor that may contrast this spatial correlation across communes is the link between 
the distribution of the percentage of university students and the distribution of the percentage 
of illiterate population. Although the percentage university students are highly correlated with 
1 La Candelaria corresponds to the downtown of the city. The majority of the economic activity and the 
commercial trade happen in this zone. That is the main reason why the average income is relatively higher. 
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the location of the universities, its distribution shows a particular opposite behavior with 
respect to the illiterate population distribution. The communes to the north of the city have 
been in the top distribution of illiterate population, and also the bottom in university students. 
This brings up the vicious circle that less educated parents raise less educated sons, compared 
with those with more educated parents. That in conjunction with lower labor income, let some 
communes be more vulnerable to others with respect to crime victimization. 
 
5.2. Spatial Panel Data Models 
Using the methodology exposed in the third section, we estimated the four different 
specifications of spatial panels. We also defined a contiguity matrix type “Queen”, that means 
that we consider neighbors of the commune i, those communes that share a border with i. 
Although there are a lot of possible definitions of the contiguity matrix, we rely on this broadly 
used matrix to capture the spillover effect of being surrounded by neighbors with high or low 
homicide rate. 
The result obtained from the four specifications can be found in Table 1. Notice that the spatial 
panel’s coefficients cannot be interpreted as a traditional beta, because the spatial lags play a 
multiplier role of a traditional marginal impact. However, these coefficients allow us to 
understand the direction of the marginal direct effect and also how significant they are. 
Some main remarks arise from Table 1. One of them is the relevance of the university students. 
This variable can be labeled as a protective factor of homicides, more population studying 
tertiary education leads to lower homicide rates. Another significant variable that plays the 
role of a protective factor is the index of Quality of Life. It has a negative and significant 
coefficient, which means that improvements in the quality of life in a commune leads on 
reducing crime in that commune. The corresponding dummy of “Donbernabilidad” let us infer 
that indeed during the years of 2005 to 2008 the reduction and stability of the homicides rate 
had been driven by one significant external factor, that according to what we exposed in 
previous sections, can be attributed to the control under one person of the main illegal gangs 
in the city. 
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Table 1: Spatial Panel Models 
  SAR SEM SARAR Durbin 
Ln(Income) -0.29744 -0.43468* -0.33181 -0.56124** 
  (0.19757) (0.25905) (0.22400) (0.28141) 
Ln(Population) -7.65300*** -7.07781 -2.47884 -4.13329 
  (2.69105) (4.50167) (4.74364) (2.57024) 
Dummy -0.32476*** -0.61115*** -0.81678*** -0.23751*** 
  (0.05619) (0.13680) (0.30648) (0.06500) 
Ln(Male population) 6.79444* 6.65348 2.54032 3.51006 
  (3.62885) (4.76506) (4.59140) (3.57755) 
Ln(Social security) 0.06764 0.01351 0.01635 0.07431 
  (0.12368) (0.11248) (0.09708) (0.12236) 
Quality of Life Index -0.08830* -0.10308** -0.08153** -0.09840** 
  (0.04986) (0.04415) (0.04030) (0.04592) 
% Illiterate population 1.39994 -0.46676 -0.58508 0.67243 
  (2.85114) (3.92084) (3.47348) (2.74392) 
% University students -0.98813** -1.41855*** -1.02651*** -1.03724** 
  (0.48405) (0.42747) (0.27765) (0.47817) 
rho 0.56871***  -0.59648*** 0.60415*** 
  (0.06678)   (0.10766) (0.06407) 
lambda  0.62563*** 0.85091***  
    (0.05519) (0.03596)   
W*Ln(Income)   0.54800** 
        (0.21855) 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. % means percentage values over the total population of each 
commune. Rho (𝜌𝜌) and Lambda (𝜆𝜆) are the spatial coefficients associated with the number of 
homicides and error term, respectively (see Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)). 
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It is relevant to mention that for all the models the spatial lags are significant to a level of 
confidence of 99%. Both, spatial lag of the ln (homicides) and the spatial lag of the error term, 
expose the relevance of the geographical interaction between units of analysis especially when 
we are analyzing the patterns of crime variables. Finally, our main variable of interest, ln 
(Income), is just statistically significant at 95% level of confidence for the Durbin Model and 
the coefficient is negative, meaning that increases in permanent income in a commune i leads 
in a decrease of homicides in the same commune. Although this result is not consistent with 
the rest of the spatial panels we have to take into account that the Durbin Model includes a 
spatial lag of the ln (Income). This specification allows us to infer that income just becomes 
relevant when we consider their spatial correlation across units. 
In order to corroborate this last statement, Table 2 presents some results for statistical test 
which contrast the different specifications of spatial panel. This table is helpful in the way that 
it gives us the individual information of each test, nevertheless, we want to focus on the last 
column that presents the conclusion of each test. According to this, the Durbin Model is a 
good option to identify the data generation process. Having this in mind, Table 3 separates the 
total marginal effect of each variable in Durbin’s estimation in its direct and indirect effect. 
 
Table 2: Tests between Spatial Panel Models 
Test Method Statistic P-value Result 
SAR Lineal Wald 6.29 0.0122 
Durbin is not represented by 
SAR 
SEM 
No-lineal 
Wald 
2.43 0.1189 
Durbin is not represented by 
SEM 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: More details can be found in the methodology section; and for more references see (Belotti et 
al, 2013). 
 
First of all, we have to mention that the direct effect measures the impact that each variable 
has on the dependent variable for the same unit of analysis: changes in 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 leads in changes in 
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, while the indirect effect refers to the impact that each variable has on the dependent 
variable given the spatial interaction across units, in a broad approach that means: changes in 
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𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 leads in changes in 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 through changes in 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 (𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑃𝑃, and i and j considered as neighbors). It 
is also relevant to mention that given this approach we should not expect significance in the 
indirect effect of the variable of ln(Income). That is because the Durbin Model specified the 
indirect effect as a direct impact including the variable of W*ln(Income), so we are allowing 
that the income in commune j directly affects homicides in commune i without first impacts 
homicides in commune j. 
 
Table 3: Marginal effects of Durbin's model broken by direct and indirect component 
  Direct Indirect Total 
Ln(Income) -0.51889** 0.48972 -0.02917 
  (0.24201) (0.35354) (0.46030) 
Ln(Population) -4.5154 -6.02503 -10.54044 
  (3.30093) (4.89595) (8.09356) 
Dummy -0.26395*** -0.33406*** -0.59801*** 
  (0.08021) (0.12278) (0.19107) 
Ln(Male population) 3.78342 5.16472 8.94814 
  (4.43867) (6.25181) (10.60245) 
Ln(Social security) 0.10891 0.13164 0.24056 
  (0.14157) (0.18125) (0.32036) 
Quality of Life Index -0.10884** -0.13666* -0.24550** 
  (0.05173) (0.07222) (0.12048) 
% Illiterate population 0.19824 0.07914 0.27739 
  (3.50195) (4.44038) (7.90103) 
% University students -1.28118** -1.67269* -2.95387** 
  (0.54485) (0.87519) (1.38431) 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. % means percentage values over the total population of each 
commune. The total impact is the sum of the indirect and direct component. 
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Table 3 shows the significance of the direct and indirect impact of the dummy variable 2005 
to 2008, Quality of Life Index and percentage of university students. All of these variables are 
acting as a protective factor against crime, however, the most impressive results are that the 
magnitude of the indirect effect overtakes the direct impact. This also supports the relevance 
of the specification, showing the important role of the spatial interactions across units of 
analysis. Focusing then on public policy, this gives us the idea of a better possible design of 
political interventions, interventions that take into account that those indirect effects can be 
more resource efficient. 
Although in Table 3 we identified the specific relevance of some variables and also their direct 
and indirect impact on homicides, we are more interested in how this can help us in designing 
public policy interventions. It is worldwide considered that some public policies should be 
specific oriented, i.e. some public policies should be localized in those specific places where 
the social problem is more intensified. However, in this sense, we will take into account also 
those places where the spatial effect (or indirect effect on neighbors) is more beneficial. In 
other words, we want to take advantage of this spatial impact to make some interventions 
more efficient and also targeted the right key players. 
In order to do that, we rely on the methodology of Drukker et al. (2013). This methodology 
simulates the impact of one intervention across the units of analysis. So this process allows 
different levels of impact depending on the specific characteristics of unit i and its neighbors. 
We extend the Drukker et al. methodology to apply on spatial panel data.  
Table 4 presents the results of an intervention that increased the permanent income of each 
commune in 1%. Furthermore, the impact of this intervention is divided by commune of 
intervention and by individual and spatial effect. The individual effect refers to the impact on 
homicides in the intervened commune and the spatial effect to the impact on neighbors’ 
homicides. As one of the main conclusions, the spatial impact has an opposite sign with 
respect to the individual one, i.e., increases in permanent income of commune i, keeping the 
rest of the variables and communes’ characteristics unaffected, leads to increases in homicides 
in i's neighbors. This result supports the studies of Menezes et al (2013) and Scorzafave & 
Soares (2009) in Brazil. The mechanism by which this can be explained is based on a context 
of inequality presence, based on the existence of inequality across units of analysis, an 
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increase in the income of one of them can attract some potential offenders from neighbor’s 
units and cause an increase in violence. 
 
Table 4: Individual and Spatial Effects of a 1% increase in the Permanent Income in each 
commune. 
Commune Individual Effect Spatial Effect Total Effect 
Decreasing 
Marginal Rate 
Aranjuez -0.477 0.047 -0.430 -0.005 
San Javier -0.473 0.053 -0.420 -0.006 
Buenos Aires -0.470 0.058 -0.411 -0.006 
Castilla -0.470 0.059 -0.411 -0.007 
Guayabal -0.469 0.060 -0.408 -0.007 
Doce de Octubre -0.468 0.062 -0.406 -0.007 
Popular -0.465 0.066 -0.399 -0.007 
Santa Cruz -0.465 0.066 -0.399 -0.007 
Robledo -0.462 0.072 -0.390 -0.008 
El Poblado -0.461 0.072 -0.389 -0.008 
La América -0.460 0.075 -0.385 -0.008 
Laureles Estadio -0.460 0.075 -0.384 -0.008 
Manrique -0.456 0.081 -0.375 -0.009 
Belén -0.456 0.082 -0.374 -0.009 
La Candelaria -0.455 0.083 -0.372 -0.009 
Villla Hermosa -0.452 0.088 -0.364 -0.010 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: Each row corresponds to the result of the 1% increase in the permanent income for the commune 
i, and all the other variables and communes remaining constant. The individual effect refers to the 
variation of homicides in the commune i, while the spatial effect represents the average variation in 
the homicides of i's neighbors. The total effect corresponds to the individual plus the spatial effect. 
Finally, the decreasing marginal rate is the rate in which the spatial effect is dismissing each year, i.e. 
the spatial effect represents the impact of i on i's neighbors; and this effect is weakened by the 
decreasing marginal rate each year.  
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 The results of the income simulation have some influence in the design of public policy for 
crime deterrence. Table 4 shows how different is the impact of the intervention depending on 
the commune intervened. Although both, individual and spatial effect, are fairly close across 
units, each minimum difference leads to different total impacts of the income intervention. As 
an example, an increase in the permanent income of Aranjuez in 1% implies a reduction in 
the homicides in Aranjuez in nearly 0.48% and an increase of the homicides in Aranjuez’s 
neighbors in 0.05%. If the same intervention is done in the commune Villa Hermosa, the 
decrease in homicides is 0.45% and the increase on its neighbors in on average nearly to 
0.09%. Then, in a context where increases of 1% of permanent income in Aranjuez cost as 
much as in Villa Hermosa, the intervention of the first one seems to be more efficient than in 
the second one. However, these results have to be considered carefully, because as we 
mentioned before they depend on the cost of intervention and also on their strategical location 
in the city, i.e. the spatial impact can be huge in low homicide zone while in high homicide 
zone the spatial impact could be lower; in real terms, an increase of 0.05% in a high homicide 
area can mean more homicides than an increase of 0.1% in low homicides zone. 
Besides, there is an extra column in Table 4 that shows the Decreasing Marginal Rate of the 
spatial effect. This value represents the rate at which the spatial effect is vanishing each year. 
This means that the spatial effect is not permanent, and according to this simulation, it lasts 
approximately 10 years. As it is expected, the communes where the spatial impact is greater 
tend to be the same with the high decreasing marginal rate. This behavior can be explained in 
a general way by the fact that the direct and indirect effect have opposite signs, this should be 
seen as a positive pattern meaning that the increases in neighbor’s homicides under a particular 
intervention do not tend to be constant across time. 
Finally, if we average the total effect of an intervention that increases the permanent income 
in 1% of each commune we obtain the average elasticity of income on homicides for the whole 
city. So an increase in 1% in permanent income leads on average to a decrease of 0.39% of 
the homicides in the city. This is an inelastic response which is in accordance with previous 
investigations. However, it is important to mention that the impact varies across communes 
with Aranjuez being the leader (reduction of 0.43%) and Villa Hermosa in the bottom of the 
magnitude of the impact (reduction of 0.36%). 
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 5.3. Robustness 
Two main approaches have been employed to check the robustness of the principal results. 
On one hand, we compare the Kernel Distribution Function of the real ln (Homicides) with 
the prediction of the Spatial Panel Data. On the other hand, we would like to check whether 
the main results change when we modified the Durbin model, adding or dropping some 
regressors or including their spatial lags. 
 
Figure 4: Kernel Density Function for observed and predicted ln(Homicides) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Note: the dotted lines came from the Durbin specification model. Although there is not an overlapping 
of the real and predicted series for those high values of homicides, broadly speaking the behavior of 
the distribution is similar. 
 
Figure 4 compares the Kernel Density Distribution Function of the real ln (Homicides) and 
two other variables obtained from the Spatial Panel Data Model, the reduced form and the 
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“naïve” approach. The reduced form refers to the predicted ln (Homicides) using the 
characteristic information matrix of the Spatial Model.2 The “naïve” approach is commonly 
named so because it is based on a linear common prediction, but just adding the spatial 
component.3 Broadly speaking, the distribution between the real and the predicted series is 
not so different, keeping in mind that all these spatial models establish a particular distribution 
a priori. However, one specific remark is that the model is overestimating the mode of the 
distribution, which implies that around the mode in particular, and in the center of the 
distribution in general, the reduction impact of any intervention can be overestimated. Taking 
this into account, better policies may be designed. 
The second robustness check is presented in Annex 2. It contains four different specifications 
of the main Durbin model. Those specifications include the spatial lags of other regressors, as 
ln (Male population) and the Percentage of University students. These variations do not lead 
to significant changes of our results, the ln (Income), the Quality of Life Index, the Dummy 
variable, and the Percentage of University students are still significant and considered as 
protective factor of homicides. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper presents an unusual approach used in emerging economies. The crime analysis by 
spatial models allows the identification of elements that traditional models do not consider, 
such as spatial unit and the relationships with its neighbors. In this case, the homicides can be 
explained by individual characteristics of each commune of the city, as well as the 
characteristics and crime levels in the neighbors of the same. 
One of the goals of this work was to quantify the elasticity of permanent income against crime. 
Spatial panels found that the elasticity is -0.39 and it differs from any other traditional panel 
estimation given that this exercise included the spatial relationship patterns typical of studies 
about crime and for urban analysis. It should be noted that this elasticity is an average between 
the responses of the different communes to an increment of 1% in the income level of each 
2 The reduced form equation is ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (𝐼𝐼 − 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖)−1(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖), where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 refers to the individual 
fixed heterogeneity component of a Durbin Model with Fixed Effects and 𝐼𝐼 corresponds to the identity matrix. 
3 The equation referred in this approach is ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 ln(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑒𝑒𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖. 
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commune keeping the rest of the values constant. Thus, if the intervention happens in the 
commune of Aranjuez the level of homicides can decrease to about 0.43% while if the 
intervention happens in the commune of Villa Hermosa the impact will be 0.364%. 
It is due to these results that we can suggest that the behavior of public investment and the 
government intervention should not be based only on what the commune is expected to 
improve if intervened, but also in how much contribution will have the commune in the 
development of its neighbors. Public policies must be formulated, with a focus on investments 
that obey better individual and spatial responds, rather than simply seeking the mitigation of 
a problem that can be transitory. 
In this sense, the “policy makers” must act on what the priority of social development should 
be in the city, improve living conditions or reduce the disparities between communes. It is 
clear then that for “policy makers” it is much more convenient to structure development 
policies that seek to increase the general conditions of the population, rather than the ones that 
seek to reduce disparities. This is because the fundamental policies in spatial analysis, which 
take into account the differences in the distribution of variables, involve not only acting on 
vulnerable sectors but do it in a controlled manner and in multiple dimensions. So, there must 
be taken into account not only the criminal conditions but also the existing relationship 
between this variable and the socioeconomic characteristics of each commune. 
Concerning these variables of individual characteristics, this study found that the quality of 
life in the communes is primordial in overcoming crime, as referenced in the literature on the 
case. The quality of life includes several dimensions, where two of the primary are health and 
education. Although this research shows that basic education itself is not sufficient to face the 
crime problem, education still is one of the best ways to deter crime. The crime patterns in the 
city are now responding to the population enrolled in postsecondary education. We found a 
particular large indirect effect of the percentage population in universities, not only explained 
for the tradeoff of the young population between crime and study but also for the externalities 
caused from the knowledge generation (innovation, entrepreneurship, city integration and 
availability of human capital). 
Another contribution that this work has to offer is the formalized demonstration of the 
“Donbernabilidad” effect, referenced by Martin (2012). Events in the years 2005-2008, in 
which illegal groups structured governance strategies outside the legal institutions at the same 
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time that the mayor’s office conducted some institutional efforts, becomes the clearest 
example of an intervention that worked as an exogenous shock to reduce the level of 
homicides over those years. However, we have to be aware that this type of facts is not long-
run interventions. Medellin has faced these two ways of crime improvements: one strongly 
dependent on an external factor (2005-2008) and other as a result of multiple socioeconomic 
and security policies (2011-2014). This experience had given us some learnings, one of them 
the relevance of socioeconomic intervention to reach long-run objectives. 
As one of the general advice that we want to expose is that all political interventions should 
be done in a controlled manner and in multiple dimensions in order to achieve satisfactory 
results. As is proven in this research, interventions have often side effects. Effects that should 
be discussed and try to quantify before the intervention. This can help not only to focus 
resources and identify the most vulnerable population but to complement with other 
interventions that can face the negative side effects that can arise. 
This paper concludes by recognizing the need for accurate, reliable, and available information 
from the responsible institutions. If theories on the economics of crime are revisited, the 
deterrence would not only depend on interventions of socioeconomic variables, but also in 
matters related to police force and security investment. That is why this work wants to leave, 
on the research agenda, the need for additional exercise where variables of institutional force 
(police and justice) will be included, when there is certainty that such information exists and 
is reliable. 
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Annex 1: 
Human Development Index4 and Quality of Life Index, average 2004-2013. 
 
Geographical distribution of the principal variables, first year of analysis (2004) and last year 
of analysis (2013). 
 
4 The average calculated for Human Development Index correspond to the time period 2004-2011. 
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] 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from INML, Sijin, National Police, Survey of Quality of 
Life and Medellin’s Municipality. 
Note: Intense blue refers to greater values of the variable, i.e. dark blue corresponds to the highest 
values for each variable mapped. 
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Annex 2 
  Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 
Ln(Income) -0.55193** -0.50272* -0.53485* -0.47596* 
  (0.27580) (0.26576) (0.28327) (0.26495) 
Ln(Population) -3.99714 -4.64866* -4.80846* -5.33257** 
  (2.62507) (2.50810) (2.52903) (2.44795) 
Dummy -0.23305*** -0.33283*** -0.27453*** -0.37057*** 
  (0.06140) (0.07915) (0.06745) (0.07136) 
Ln(Male population) 3.38918 3.42206 4.2378 4.15596 
  (3.63606) (3.70029) (3.48984) (3.62354) 
Ln(Social security) 0.07575 0.07601 0.05891 0.06057 
  (0.12167) (0.11898) (0.12644) (0.12253) 
Quality of Life Index -0.09838** -0.08690* -0.08827* -0.07673* 
  (0.04581) (0.04581) (0.04615) (0.04519) 
% Illiterate population   0.23934 1.48764 1.05504 
    (2.66840) (2.97638) (2.89310) 
% University students -1.06681** -1.07690** -1.13853** -1.17825** 
  (0.45659) (0.51607) (0.48481) (0.52626) 
rho 0.60315*** 0.58707*** 0.59259*** 0.57498*** 
  (0.06432) (0.06354) (0.06168) (0.05970) 
W*Ln(Income) 0.55368** 0.63617*** 0.2591 0.34596 
  (0.21969) (0.24682) (0.27083) (0.27010) 
W*Ln(Male population) -3.51377**  -3.52426** 
    (1.68214)   (1.68867) 
W*University students    1.52405** 1.53029** 
      (0.71878) (0.65353) 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
Note: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. % means percentage values over the total population of each 
commune. Rho (𝜌𝜌) and Lambda (𝜆𝜆) are the spatial coefficients associated with the number of 
homicides and error term, respectively (see Eq. (3) and Eq. (4)). 
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